Delegates to the informal meetings preceding SB-13 met to
consider: policies and measures (P&Ms); technology
transfer; land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF);
capacity building; compliance; FCCC Article 4.8 and 4.9 and
Protocol Article 3.14 (adverse effects); the mechanisms; and
guidelines under Protocol Articles 5 (methodological issues),
7 (communication of information) and 8 (review of
information).
INFORMAL MEETINGS
POLICIES AND MEASURES: After outlining recent
developments on P&Ms, Chair Jose Romero (Switzerland)
requested Parties to focus on developing a decision for COP-6.
The EU proposed objectives relating to: information exchange
and experience; facilitating cooperation between Parties; and
facilitating assessment of demonstrable progress. CANADA asked
whether facilitating cooperation would be a bilateral,
trilateral or multilateral exercise. The US and AUSTRALIA said
countries could demonstrate progress through institutional and
legal steps taken to achieve Protocol Article 3.1 commitments,
while JAPAN suggested the assessment be based on national
communications. The MARSHALL ISLANDS, for AOSIS, stressed the
need for Annex I Parties to take domestic action through
P&Ms, while ZIMBABWE highlighted their impact on
developing countries.
On text for a COP-6 decision, the EU emphasized the need
for a "continuous and structured process" to address
the issues within its proposed objectives. SWITZERLAND, with
AOSIS, supported using the EU proposal as the basis for the
COP-6 decision. TANZANIA sought clarity on the need for a
separate reporting system for demonstrable progress, and
proposed specifying timeframes for information exchange. PERU
underlined cost implications associated with best practices.
Draft elements for decision will be available Thursday
morning.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: Co-Chairs Dean Cooper (Canada) and
Dapo Afolabi (Nigeria) invited SBSTA Chair Dovland to present
results from the Friends of the Chair consultations on
development and transfer of technology held in Colorado, USA,
which are contained in a non-paper. He highlighted the five
key themes identified at SBSTA-12: technology needs and needs
assessment, technology information, enabling environments,
capacity building and mechanisms for technology transfer. The
US stressed, inter alia, the role of the private sector
and the importance of holistic, bottom-up approaches. SAUDI
ARABIA said technology transfer required adequate funds and
called for an annual financial commitment by donor countries.
On the question of who will drive the process, UGANDA
underscored the role of governments. HONDURAS urged
consideration of the role of existing organizations,
especially those involved in higher education. The PHILIPPINES
expressed concern that discussions still revolved around
assessing needs and suggested renewing the discussions from
COP-1 to establish an intergovernmental advisory panel on
technology with equitable geographic representation.
LULUCF: Participants considered Parties’ submissions
on LULUCF contained in a consolidated synthesis document
prepared by the Secretariat. On the definition of
"forest," the EU favored the FAO definition, with
limited flexibility to consider national circumstances. JAPAN
and CANADA supported flexibility and said definitions used
should be clearly and transparently reported. TUVALU called
for a universal definition of forest, cautioning against too
much flexibility. The US outlined a compromise following the
general structure of the FAO definition, with flexibility
regarding key parameters, where Parties would choose a single
value from a range of accepted values.
On the definitions on afforestation, reforestation and
deforestation (ARD), JAPAN highlighted the FAO activity-based
approach, with the harvest-regeneration cycle included under
reforestation. AUSTRALIA highlighted its suggested distinction
between degradation and deforestation. CANADA suggested
aggradation-degradation be included under Article 3.4. The US
said Article 3.3 and 3.4 definitions should be considered as a
package.
On accounting, INDIA stressed the difficulties inherent in
differentiating between indirect and direct human-induced
activities. The EU supported reporting on, but not accounting
for, non-CO2 greenhouse gases. AUSTRALIA highlighted proposed
sub-rules to overcome perverse incentives for deforestation
prior to the first commitment period. JAPAN said Parties
should be able to account for stock changes in all carbon
pools, but should decide themselves which pools to include.
CAPACITY BUILDING: SBI Chair John Ashe said the meeting’s
aim was to discuss the conclusions of the capacity development
initiative (CDI) regional reviews.
Regional group meetings: Following an introduction to
the CDI regional assessments, smaller groups were convened to
discuss reports of the regional reviews.
The group of Small Island Developing States considered ways
to take the process forward. Participants noted that it would
take a number of years to establish CDI activities and that
interim actions could be taken at the regional level to
address immediate needs already identified.
The Asia-Pacific meeting discussed the report’s focus on
the need to, inter alia: strengthen existing networks
of regional and national experts and institutions offering
training; broaden the base of participation and action;
consider specific social and cultural context in technology
transfer; and ensure that capacity development is
country-driven.
Participants in the African meeting expressed concern with
the process of developing the regional reviews, and called for
more time to consider the report. Questions raised included
whether the questionnaire was based on GEF guidelines or on
the different COP decisions, and if there has been an
assessment of the response costs.
The Eastern Europe and Central Asia group highlighted, inter
alia, a short-term project-based and long-term systematic
approach to capacity building, and regional diversity.
Participants in the group for Latin America and the
Caribbean emphasized the lack of negotiating capacity, which
is affected by rapid rotation of diplomatic staff, and the
need for financial resources for countries to manage their own
capacity-building priorities. They also stressed the need to
improve interaction between the GEF and national focal points.
COMPLIANCE: Following a report by Co-Chair Dovland on
the informal consultations held in Iceland on 18-20 July 2000,
Parties discussed the structure of a compliance body. The EU
expressed its preference for: one body with two branches; a
powerful Chair; enforcement measures applying only to Annex I
countries; and facilitative measures applying to the
obligations of all Parties. SOUTH AFRICA, for the G-77/CHINA,
noted her preference for one body with two branches subject to
certain conditions, including that: the enforcement branch
apply only to Annex I countries; the composition of both
branches reflect geographic distribution; and the branches
have clearly delineated mandates. With the US, she underlined
the need for certainty and due process, and with the RUSSIAN
FEDERATION opposed the EU proposal for a powerful Chair. The
US accepted the proposed structure of one body with two
branches and underlined the US focus on commitments rather
than on Parties. BRAZIL noted that this could co-exist with a
clear statement that non-Annex I Parties did not have
commitments. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION and JAPAN, opposed by
SAMOA, preferred consecutive rather than parallel functions,
with the facilitative stage preceding enforcement.
The EU proposed that the compliance body comprise a
technical team for facilitation and a legal team for
enforcement. JAPAN, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, BRAZIL and
SWITZERLAND opposed this division. SWITZERLAND proposed a
single body performing both functions but with a screening
panel that would determine the procedure to be followed in
each case. SAUDI ARABIA suggested that a modified multilateral
consultative process serve as a facilitative body in this
structure.
ADVERSE EFFECTS: Co-Chair Bo Kjellén (Sweden)
introduced the Co-Chairs’ text intended to be used as a
basis for COP-6 negotiating text. ZIMBABWE, for the
G-77/CHINA, called for two draft decisions, one relating to
FCCC Article 4.8 and 4.9, and the other to Protocol Article
3.14. The EU, with the US, preferred taking one decision on
both. On the Co-Chairs’ text, the EU suggested removing the
section on Protocol Article 3.14, and integrating it into the
sections on adverse effects and the impact of response
measures.
UGANDA, the GAMBIA, NEPAL, BURKINA FASO, the US and others
said the needs and concerns of least developed countries
should be clearly articulated in the text and in decisions.
Co-Chair Kjellén noted participants’ support for using the
Co-Chairs’ text as the basis for negotiations.
PROTOCOL ARTICLES 5, 7 & 8: Participants considered
elements of draft guidelines under Article 7. SAUDI ARABIA
underscored that the G-77/CHINA needed more time to consider
the guidelines. Parties agreed on the EU proposal to add
separate headings on guidelines for reporting of supplementary
information under Article 7.1 and 7.2. On Reporting of
Information under Article 7.1, delegates bracketed language
related to timeframes for reporting. NEW ZEALAND drew
attention to cross-cutting elements between the guidelines and
ongoing work in the LULUCF group. Co-Chair Plume, supported by
AUSTRALIA, noted the need to move forward on the elements
without pre-empting the work of the other groups. Stressing
the amount of work under Articles 5, 7, and 8, Co-Chair Plume
suggested creating a small group to progress work on the
guidelines under Article 8. Delegates agreed to work only on
Part II of the guidelines, which will be presented to the
larger group on Friday.
MECHANISMS: Chair Chow presented the institutional
issues relating to the CDM. He outlined, inter alia:
the responsibilities and authorities of COP/MOP and the
Executive Board (EB) as set out in Protocol Article 12 (CDM);
the tasks and functions of the EB relating to the
accreditation of operational entities, registration of
projects, the reference manual, and issuance of CERs; the
tasks and functions of COP/MOP; and the rules of procedure of
the EB. On the role of the COP/MOP, SOUTH AFRICA, supported by
SAMOA, identified an overlap in the functions assigned to the
COP/MOP, the EB and the compliance body. She cautioned against
creating a situation that could lead to forum shopping. INDIA
pointed out that in the Chair�s presentation "the EBs
had gained and the COP/MOP and Operational Entities had
lost." He suggested reconsidering the balance and
bringing out linkages. SAMOA, supported by the EU, reminded
Parties of the agreement at Kyoto that the COP/MOP would not
deal with routine CDM concerns. With the US, she stressed the
need for technical expertise in the EB. The EU envisaged a
variety of functions for the EB, including: issuing CERs;
project registration; and issues related to accreditation of
Operational Entities. The REPUBLIC OF KOREA said that without
a clear idea of the nature of the CDM and the number of
expected projects, it would be impossible to elaborate on the
EB. NORWAY responded that the structure of the CDM would
influence the volume of CDM projects. CHINA, supported by
JAPAN and AUSTRALIA, said Parties, not the EB, could determine
criteria to determine contribution to sustainable development.
IN THE CORRIDORS
Some participants have expressed concern at the apparent
lack of urgency for making substantial progress on Articles 5,
7 and 8. Given the heavy workload facing this group, observers
warn that a lack of movement in working through remaining text
could prove problematic later on.
