



BONN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE: 10-14 MARCH 2014

The fourth meeting of the second session of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-4) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place from 10-14 March 2014 in Bonn, Germany. The conference brought together 1071 participants, including delegates from governments and observers from civil society, academia, intergovernmental organizations and the private sector.

Under workstream 1 (2015 agreement), the meeting convened throughout the week in open-ended consultations on agenda item 3, which addressed: adaptation; nationally determined contributions; finance, technology and capacity-building (means of implementation); ambition and equity; mitigation; transparency of action and support; and other issues related to elements. An in-session workshop addressed domestic preparations for intended nationally determined contributions.

Under workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition), technical expert meetings on renewable energy (RE) and energy efficiency (EE) convened. Each technical expert meeting included sessions on: policies, practices and technology—global state of play; implementing actions—finance, technology and capacity building; and discussion of the way forward.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

The international political response to climate change began with the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, which sets out a framework for action aimed at stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Convention, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, now has 195 parties.

In December 1997, delegates to the third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, agreed to a protocol to the UNFCCC that committed industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market economy to achieve emission reduction targets. These countries, known as Annex I parties under the UNFCCC, agreed to reduce their overall emissions of six GHGs by an average of 5% below 1990 levels in 2008-2012 (first commitment period), with specific targets varying from

country to country. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005, and now has 192 parties.

LONG-TERM NEGOTIATIONS IN 2005-2009:

Convening in Montreal, Canada, in 2005, the first Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 1) decided to establish the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Annex I Parties’ Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) in accordance with Protocol Article 3.9, which mandated consideration of Annex I parties’ further commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period.

COP 11 created a process to consider long-term cooperation under the Convention through a series of four workshops known as “the Convention Dialogue.”

In December 2007, COP 13 and CMP 3 in Bali, Indonesia, resulted in agreement on the Bali Roadmap on long-term issues. COP 13 adopted the Bali Action Plan and established the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) with a mandate to focus on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology and a shared vision for long-term cooperative action. Negotiations on Annex I parties’ further commitments continued under the AWG-KP. The deadline for concluding the two-track negotiations was Copenhagen in 2009.

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COPENHAGEN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, took place in December 2009. The high-profile event was marked by disputes over transparency and process. During the high-level segment, informal negotiations took place in a group consisting of major economies and representatives of regional and other negotiating groups. Late in the evening of 18 December, these talks resulted in a political agreement, the “Copenhagen Accord,” which was then presented to the COP plenary for adoption. After 13 hours of debate, delegates ultimately agreed to “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord. In 2010, over 140 countries indicated support for the Accord. More than 80 countries provided information on their national mitigation targets or actions. Parties also agreed to extend the mandates of the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP to 2010.

CANCUN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico, took place in December 2010, where parties finalized the Cancun Agreements. Under the Convention track, Decision 1/CP.16 recognized the need for deep cuts in global emissions in order to limit the global average temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Parties agreed to consider strengthening the global long-term goal during a Review by 2015, including in relation to a proposed 1.5°C target. They took note of emission reduction targets and nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) communicated by developed and developing countries, respectively. Decision 1/CP.16 also addressed other aspects of mitigation, such as: measuring, reporting and verification (MRV); and reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+).

The Cancun Agreements also established several new institutions and processes, including the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the Adaptation Committee, and the Technology Mechanism, which includes the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was created and designated as an operating entity of the Convention’s financial mechanism governed by a 24-member board. Parties agreed to set up a Transitional Committee tasked with the Fund’s design and a Standing Committee to assist the COP with respect to the financial mechanism. Parties also recognized the commitment by developed countries to provide US\$30 billion of fast-start finance in 2010-2012, and to jointly mobilize US\$100 billion per year by 2020.

Under the Protocol track, the CMP urged Annex I parties to raise the level of ambition towards achieving aggregate emission reductions consistent with the range identified in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and adopted Decision 2/CMP.6 on land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). The mandates of the two AWGs were extended for another year.

DURBAN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, South Africa, took place from 28 November to 11 December 2011. The Durban outcomes covered a wide range of topics, notably the establishment of a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, a decision on long-term cooperative action under the Convention and agreement on the operationalization

of the GCF. Parties also agreed to launch the new ADP with a mandate “to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.” The ADP is scheduled to complete these negotiations by 2015. The new instrument should enter into effect in 2020. The ADP was also mandated to explore actions to close the pre-2020 ambition gap in relation to the 2°C target.

DOHA: The UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, took place from 26 November to 8 December 2012. The conference resulted in a package of decisions, referred to as the “Doha Climate Gateway.” These include amendments to the Kyoto Protocol to establish its second commitment period and agreement to terminate the AWG-KP’s work in Doha. The parties also agreed to terminate the AWG-LCA and negotiations under the Bali Action Plan. A number of issues requiring further consideration were transferred to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), such as: the 2013-15 review of the global goal; developed and developing country mitigation; the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms; national adaptation plans (NAPs); MRV; market and non-market mechanisms; and REDD+. Key elements of the Doha outcome also included agreement to consider loss and damage, “such as an institutional mechanism to address loss and damage in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.”

ADP 2: ADP 2 met in Bonn, Germany, from 29 April to 3 May 2013. The session was structured around workshops and roundtable discussions, covering the ADP’s two workstreams. Many felt this format was helpful in moving the ADP discussions forward. Several delegates noted, however, that the ADP needs to become more focused and interactive in future sessions.

BONN 2013: The Bonn Climate Change Conference took place from 3-14 June 2013. SBI 38 was characterized by an agenda dispute concerning a proposal by the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine to introduce a new item on legal and procedural issues related to decision-making under the COP and CMP. As no solution to the dispute was found, the SBI was unable to launch substantive work. SBSTA 38 achieved what many saw as good progress, *inter alia*, on REDD+ and several methodological issues. The resumed ADP 2 was structured around workshops and roundtables. No agreement was reached on establishing one or more contact groups to move part of the work to a more formal setting. Many, however, felt that switching to a negotiating mode will be important to ensure that the ADP makes progress in future sessions.

WARSAW: The Warsaw Climate Change Conference took place from 11-23 November 2013, in Warsaw, Poland. Negotiations focused on the implementation of agreements reached at previous meetings, including pursuing the work of the ADP, which convened the third part of its second session (ADP 2-3). The meeting adopted an ADP decision that invites parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined contributions, and resolves to accelerate the full implementation of the Bali Action Plan and pre-2020 ambition. Parties also adopted a decision establishing the Warsaw

international mechanism on loss and damage, and the “Warsaw REDD+ framework,” a series of seven decisions on REDD+ finance, institutional arrangements and methodological issues.

ADP 2-4 SUMMARY

ADP Co-Chair Artur Runge-Metzger (EU) opened the session on Monday, 10 March. UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres underlined that 2014 is a year of “much promise for action and ambition” to get to a meaningful agreement in Paris. She reported on recent conversations with various stakeholders representing the private sector, the military, youth, cities and national governments, noting that they all are assuming responsibility to address climate change and support delegates’ task of setting the course of the negotiations. She called on delegates to use this support “as wind in your sails” to make this session successful and productive.

Noting that the use of glass in the World Conference Center Bonn symbolizes the transparency and inclusiveness of the ADP’s work, Co-Chair Runge-Metzger stressed that “much work remains to be accomplished,” and referred to the Co-Chairs’ reflection and scenario notes (ADP.2014.1.InformalNote and ADP.2014.2.InformalNote). He informed delegates an additional ADP session would be held in October 2014 in Bonn.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK: The meeting proceeded on the basis of the agenda (ADP/2013/AGENDA) adopted at the first meeting of ADP 2, which took place from 29 April-3 May 2013, in Bonn. Referring to the scenario note, Co-Chair Runge-Metzger explained that the Co-Chairs propose to accelerate the elaboration of the 2015 agreement through open-ended consultations, underlining that they will be fully inclusive and transparent. After referring to the principles guiding the work of the ADP, he suggested, and parties agreed, that the session would: start by addressing work on adaptation; be guided by the Co-Chairs’ questions for each session; seek views from parties at a stock-taking plenary on Wednesday; and include an in-session workshop and technical expert meetings and briefings.

OPENING STATEMENTS: ADP Co-Chair Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago) opened the floor to country statements. Bolivia, for the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China), underscored the need for the ADP to give balanced consideration to all elements under its mandate, not only mitigation. He added that discussion of financial support is essential for the Group, and that adaptation should be given appropriate attention.

With the Philippines, for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), India, for Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC), Nicaragua, for the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), and Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Group, the G-77/China said the agreement should be in accordance with the Convention’s principles, including equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and capabilities. The G-77/China and BASIC called for: the urgent ratification of the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol; Protocol parties to raise their quantified emission reduction pledges; and non-Kyoto Annex I parties to increase their ambition in a comparable manner over the same timeframe.

Greece, for the European Union (EU), called for “getting down to business” in Bonn, bearing in mind the need for a draft negotiating text of the 2015 agreement by Lima. He prioritized making progress on: agreeing on up front information to be supplied; advancing on intended nationally determined contributions (NDCs); and elaborating the rules-base of the 2015 agreement, especially MRV and accounting rules.

Australia, for the Umbrella Group, looked forward to identifying elements of the 2015 agreement and better understanding of assumptions underpinning parties’ NDCs. He highlighted the need for a flexible process to allow for deeper investigation of specific ideas, while ensuring that the 2015 agreement continues to develop as a coherent whole.

Switzerland, for the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), called for the meeting to, *inter alia*: advance common understanding of core elements of the 2015 outcome; advance confidence that all parties will undertake efforts to submit by the first half of 2015 their intended NDCs; advance understanding on information required in order to do this; and unlock opportunities for increasing efforts to reduce emissions before 2020.

Sudan, for the African Group, called for a clear work plan under both workstreams for all scheduled sessions. He emphasized the need for a common understanding of how external processes, including the UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summit, will feed into the negotiations, and called for early engagement by parties on all issues. He emphasized moving beyond exploring mitigation potentials towards exploring incentive mechanisms to increase mitigation ambition.

Highlighting the disproportionate impacts of climate change on small island developing states (SIDS), Nauru, for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), stressed that inaction will mean losing the opportunity to avert the worst impacts. She called for focusing discussions at this session on: identifying elements to be included in the 2015 agreement and information needed to allow presentation of clear and transparent NDCs; informing a process for urgent submission of parties’ proposed NDCs in a transparent and verifiable manner enabling quantification and assessment against the long-term global goal of keeping global warming below 1.5°C; and developing a process to review proposed national contributions.

While acknowledging progress, Nepal, for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), said the ADP outcome in Warsaw represented a step back on legal aspects of the 2015 agreement. He urged developed countries to increase ambition, calling for focusing in 2014 on what is required for ambitious NDCs from the outset. With AOSIS, he welcomed the focus of this meeting on RE, noting the high mitigation potential of the sector.

LMDCs called for expanding convergence as quickly as possible in order to arrive at an agreed outcome in Paris in 2015. He stressed that the adverse impacts of climate change on developing countries highlights the need for developed countries to take leadership on climate change mitigation, rather than displacing the burden onto those countries with sustainable development challenges.

The Arab Group said NDCs must be made in parallel for mitigation and adaptation. He also stressed the need to agree on, *inter alia*: the legal nature of the agreement; requisite support to developing countries; cuts in developed countries' emissions based on past emissions; and a "green light" to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) to enable them to carry out their work.

BASIC stated that in order to raise the level of ambition, parties should adhere to the structure and annexes of the Convention. He added that NDCs should cover all the pillars of the Convention, including information by developed countries on support.

ALBA said quantified, ambitious and specific emission reduction targets should be measurable. He underlined that developing countries' activities are subject to a roadmap for financial and technical support for mitigation and adaptation measures by developing countries. He emphasized that NDCs should cover mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, capacity building and finance.

Colombia, for the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), suggested the 2015 agreement contain reference to, *inter alia*: science, the CBDR and equity principles, and the collective responsibility of all parties; a global mitigation goal and mechanism to ascertain NDCs; market and non-market mechanisms; reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+); a review mechanism to assess support; a systematization of the existing adaptation instruments under the Convention; loss and damage; means of implementation (MOI); and transparency of action and support.

The African Group, LMDCs, the Arab Group, ALBA and BASIC called for a country-driven process, including establishing a contact group under workstream 1 for the development of a draft agreement.

The LDCs and LMDCs emphasized the need for developed country support for the preparation of NDCs by developing countries.

Turkey called for a dynamic differentiation among parties in accordance with CBDR, as well as for evaluating national circumstances of parties in an objective manner.

The US Council for International Business, on behalf of Business and Industry Non-Governmental Organizations (BINGOS), observed that a 2015 agreement "should not be just future-proof but future-friendly" and should favor cost effective innovation and market mechanisms.

Climate Justice Now, on behalf of Environmental NGOs (ENGOS), called for drastically scaling up progress, for formal negotiations to begin, and a vision for limiting warming to below 1.5°C.

Climate Action Network (CAN), for ENGOS, underscored the need to agree on the structure and process for developing draft negotiating text and to move into a contact group as soon as possible. She said critical elements like compliance and loss and damage should not "fall off the table."

The Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), for Women and Gender, said all actions under ADP should include strong gender-sensitive and environmental safeguards.

STOCKTAKING PLENARY

On Wednesday, 12 March, ADP Co-Chair Kishan Kumarsingh noted the need to accelerate work, calling on parties to address how to reach a negotiating text by COP 20 in Lima.

On the *thematic expert meetings*, the G-77/China called for a more interactive format. ALBA stressed that the technical expert meetings are ineffective to address important issues under workstream 2. AOSIS called for capturing all available expertise, not just from a limited number of panelists. EIG supported work under workstream 2 through the technical expert meetings.

On the *ADP schedule*, AOSIS requested clarity on how the Co-Chairs intend to capture progress from the meeting and a roadmap for future ADP sessions in 2014. The African Group and LMDCs called for a schedule of the organization of work for the remainder of the year. ALBA emphasized the need for equal negotiating time on adaptation and mitigation, and warned against the introduction of non-inclusive last-minute text.

On the *mode of work under workstream 1*, the G-77/China, supported by AOSIS, the Arab Group, the African Group, LMDCs, LDCs, ALBA, AILAC and BASIC, called for a more structured and formal mode of negotiation with the establishment of a contact group and to continue in a contact group at subsequent ADP sessions. The G-77/China emphasized this contact group would allow parties to engage directly on textual proposals, adding it must: be a party-driven process; allow input by parties; and that its output must reflect the inputs of parties.

The EU and the EIG expressed support for the current informal working mode and cautioned against an approach leading to a 300-page "pre-Copenhagen" text, but did not expressly object to a contact group. While recognizing the need to reflect the views of all parties, the US called for avoiding discussions over a very long text and preferred dealing with elements of the agreement. Canada called for clarity on the definition of a contact group.

Co-Chair Kumarsingh noted lack of objection to the formation of a single contact group, provided it is based on the mandate of the ADP and uses the same agenda. He said the plenary would reconvene on Friday to formalize the arrangement.

Saudi Arabia expressed concern over the absence of a method for developing text, emphasizing that having a text "mysteriously appear" in Lima would not be acceptable. Kuwait requested clarification over the way the text would be produced in the contact group.

The Philippines indicated that it reserves its right to make submissions, asking "Why are we scared of a 200-page document that we can all own and not of a three-page document that we do not own?" The Gambia worried discussions on process could slow progress during the June session.

ADP Co-Chair Kumarsingh stated that the agreement "can only be had after the last gavel is down in Paris," adding that the text will be built on submissions by parties.

OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS ON AGENDA ITEM 3

ADAPTATION: This issue was considered on Monday, 10 March, in discussions facilitated by ADP Co-Chair Kumarsingh. He stressed the importance for the new agreement to build on existing arrangements, including NAPs, and drew attention to the adaptation-mitigation nexus and national efforts. Parties were requested to consider the adaptation aspects of the long-term perspective, taking into consideration the guiding questions contained in the Co-Chair's scenario note for the session (ADP/2014/2 InformalNote).

On **adaptation in the 2015 Agreement**, China stated that the discussions should be framed under the heading of adaptation and not the long-term perspective. Nauru, for AOSIS, underlined that ambitious and timely mitigation is required to minimize adaptation action.

China suggested considering: which provisions of the Convention are relevant; adaptation implementation gaps; and necessary information to be submitted by developed countries on financial and technological support.

Norway recalled its submission on adaptation for the 2015 agreement, highlighting that adaptation could frame the agreement, with commitments on adaptation provided by all parties, anchored in development goals and priorities, based on science, and accounting for indigenous and traditional knowledge.

Switzerland highlighted that the 2015 agreement should provide an impulse for adaptation action, saying concrete elements could include a commitment by all parties to prepare adaptation actions and enhance the resilience of the most vulnerable.

On the enduring outcome, Grenada said the 2015 agreement should: provide a mechanism to assess the scale and scope of different economic impacts given GHG concentrations and temperature increases; provide a mechanism to bring information into the UNFCCC process; and facilitate the implementation of measures that developing countries can take to manage impacts. He said the new agreement should also: set out the relationship between mitigation and adaptation; address MOI and how it relates to NAPs; address MRV of support for adaptation; and anchor the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage.

South Africa called for expressly confirming adaptation as a global responsibility. Bangladesh and India underscored that adaptation is site-specific but a global responsibility. Egypt called for building on national and regional actions. Japan agreed that adaptation is a global responsibility, but added that actions vary by country and region, stressing there is "no one size fits all" approach. Colombia emphasized that adaptation is a matter of collective responsibility.

The EU, New Zealand, Japan, Iran, India, Nepal, for the LDCs, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland called for **building on existing institutions**. Iran stressed this requires resources. New Zealand discussed how to reflect existing structures and institutions, saying these could be referenced in the text. Switzerland proposed reconsidering existing arrangements and authorizing the COP to take them forward.

The Philippines emphasized anchoring the work of the ADP within all existing mechanisms on adaptation. Saudi Arabia underscored bridging gaps in these decisions and considering how institutions for adaptation could be enhanced. The US said the agreement could play a "crucial role" in elevating the role of adaptation in national processes.

On **loss and damage**, AOSIS emphasized reflecting the relationship between mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage, and, with Colombia, South Africa and Palau, called for the 2015 agreement to include a loss and damage mechanism. She also called for MOI to cover the costs of adaptation and loss and damage.

The EU, with Japan, said the new institution needs time to get under way and demonstrate impact. Japan noted the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism on loss and damage scheduled for 2016, stressing it is premature to place this issue in the context of adaptation in the 2015 agreement.

The Philippines said the **global goal for adaptation**, proposed by the African Group, should be included in the 2015 agreement.

The African Group outlined their proposal, saying the global goal for adaptation recognizes that the agreed temperature goal has an associated level of climate impacts and costs. He further noted that the adaptation costs associated with the long-term mitigation goal shall constitute the global adaptation goal, with an *ex ante* determination of adaptation costs based on the long-term mitigation goal, envisaged climate impacts, and the required finance and technology support.

The US questioned how a global adaptation goal could be operationalized. He described the African Group's proposal as "difficult," noting that a cooperative approach would be more successful. He said suggesting adaptation as an alternative to mitigation would be counterproductive.

The EU called for clarification on measurement of impacts, and distinguishing between costs of adaptation and general investment in sustainable development. He said that modeling and analysis of the scientific basis will continue to be an important part of ongoing efforts.

New Zealand stressed adaptation is a country-driven process that does not lend itself to a legally-binding outcome. She said a global adaptation goal would have to be high-level and directive rather than quantifiable, along the lines of "all parties shall ensure resilience to the adverse effects of climate change" by incorporating adaptation into their national responses.

Switzerland said the agreement should equip countries to enhance resilience and measure how this is being accomplished, while noting it is unclear how a global goal would advance this. Japan said the agreement should include, *inter alia*, incentives to incorporate adaptation into national planning processes and address the most vulnerable people in society.

Australia suggested considering a NAP-type commitment, emphasizing it should produce on-the-ground results and calling for clarity on the legal status of NAPs in the context of commitments. He questioned the utility of a global aggregate approach to adaptation.

On **information required for an adaptation goal**, South Africa said parties should analyze vulnerable sectors, and examine technology and capacity needs in each of these sectors.

The EU welcomed exploration of how local cost assessments can further the regime but questioned the operational role of local cost assessments as a part of determining allocation of adaptation costs among parties.

Norway highlighted the technical challenges of setting a financial goal related to adaptation, questioning whether this would result in more action on the ground. He agreed that national responsibility should be underpinned by support for vulnerable parties. Japan asked for clarification on measuring the costs of adaptation.

On AILAC's proposal for an adaptation assessment framework, Colombia explained it aims to provide guidance on: modeling climate change scenarios, vulnerability assessments, methodologies and matrices for risk assessment; quantification of non-economic losses; and methodology for monitoring and review. She noted the need for: better understanding the cost of residual damage; entry points for the private sector; and a review of the adequacy of adaptation action and support.

On *MOI*, the Philippines noted that past decisions have focused on financing adaptation because adaptation is country specific. She underscored the urgency for clarification of support, including through the capitalization of the GCF, to enable enhanced implementation of the Convention.

South Africa emphasized that *MOI* should frame the adaptation goal and commitment. Bangladesh stressed the need to clarify support for adaptation implementation. India highlighted that current funding available for adaptation is limited, calling for exploration of how the GCF can improve the predictability of finance.

Nepal noted the need for long-term adaptation finance and called for clear rules for a robust MRV framework for tracking provision of adaptation funds. Palau said support for adaptation should be framed in plans for sustainable development.

NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS:

This item was considered on Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday in discussions facilitated by ADP Co-Chair Artur Runge-Metzger. Introducing the issue, Co-Chair Runge-Metzger noted that this is the first opportunity for the ADP to define what constitutes NDCs. He underscored the need for guidance on NDC preparations, stressing that parties have variously said they should reflect national circumstances, be specific, quantitative or quantifiable, and be flexible in form and legal character.

On the *scope of NDCs*, Argentina suggested that Annex I parties' NDCs should include economy-wide emissions reduction commitments, as well as commitments on finance, technology and capacity building. China lamented the focus of the current discussions on mitigation to the detriment of other elements of the agreement. Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, the African Group, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Syria said contributions should not be limited to mitigation and include *MOI*. Cuba called for focusing on the elaboration of the elements of the agreement before focusing on contributions.

Grenada outlined dimensions of the NDCs saying they should: address mitigation and *MOI*; not be final descriptions of commitments but initial offers to be assessed against the long-term global goal; be submitted by all countries, with differentiation in types of submissions; include a specific

timeline; be submitted in a manner that ensures comparability; and be submitted as early as possible. He added that support should be provided for developing country NDCs.

Malaysia opposed a narrow view of NDCs and emphasized that developing countries face the choice between paying for adaptation or facing loss and damage. He said mitigation actions that do not include adaptation increase the risk of climate vulnerability.

The US said contributions only relate to mitigation, as adaptation action does not contribute to the overall goal to be reached in Paris. He added that all countries should make a contribution, which should be "their best effort" and accompanied by information determined relevant by each party. Australia and Switzerland stressed that other measures should not be used as a substitute to mitigation pledges.

On *the differentiation between developed and developing country NDCs*, Nauru, for AOSIS, with Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait, called for developed countries to demonstrate leadership by presenting NDCs. AOSIS urged commitments on mitigation and *MOI* that are specific and measurable. Argentina, China, Indonesia, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia said contributions should be consistent with the Convention, including with the CBDR and equity principles. Colombia, Ecuador and Iran called for contributions to be determined according to each national context and capabilities. India, supported by Malaysia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines, said national circumstances, equity and historical responsibility must underpin NDCs and should be understood in a differentiated manner; developed countries should take the lead in mitigation efforts.

Brazil said NDCs would have a legally-binding nature, but be differentiated between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Brazil said the ADP should not allow a situation in which developing countries have to go beyond current actions while developed countries lower ambition. On the information to be provided, Brazil said Annex I countries would put forward economy-wide contributions while developing countries would make submissions depending on their capacity.

The EU observed that the word "contributions" was agreed as a result of a compromise in Warsaw, and that they are the first step towards mitigation commitments. She noted that adaptation and *MOI* will have to be part of the 2015 agreement.

Norway underscored that the 2°C target will not be reached without all countries contributing to mitigation efforts, stressing that the 2015 agreement should be applicable to all. He recognized that industrialized countries will take the lead, adding that in 2020, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries will be responsible for only 28% of global emissions. Switzerland underlined the contributions are part of a legally binding agreement, and should be clear, transparent and understandable.

Australia stressed that all parties should make a contribution. He added that parties' contributions are not static and, with Canada, stated that those with the greatest capacity and responsibility should take the lead. Switzerland said the contributions should not be determined by the Convention's annexes. Turkey and Australia said the contributions should be

party-determined and, with Canada, clarified that they should take into account relevant factors, including capabilities.

Australia and Bangladesh underscored the importance of creating the confidence that all countries will contribute in terms of GHG mitigation. On the legal nature of the contributions, the US outlined various options, noting they could be legally binding or not. Bolivia called for the 2015 agreement to recognize the integrity of Mother Earth.

Singapore said the notion of NDCs imposes obligations on all parties to take actions under the Convention and, therefore, has to be consistent and guided by the Convention as part of the rules-based system. He added that all parties would need to submit NDCs, taking into account national circumstances, which would be a driver for participation in the new agreement and for long-term ambition. He emphasized that NDCs: are meant to be distinct from the notion of internationally determined contributions; can include a diversity of actions; and do not negate the need for leadership.

Brazil said contributions on mitigation should be set by parties, built on and enhanced from NAMAs and commitments under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Developing countries should have the flexibility to set two kinds of commitments, one accomplished with domestic resources and one with additional finance.

Argentina proposed Non-Annex I parties make NDCs on adaptation and mitigation contingent on the provision of finance, technology and capacity building by Annex II parties. Kuwait said NDCs must be understood in a differentiated manner, with developed countries taking economy-wide emission reduction commitments sufficient to demonstrate their leadership and developing countries would present materials on adaptation, capacity building and economic diversification, with mitigation determined by developed country support.

On *support for developing country NDCs*, AOSIS requested support from developed countries for the preparation of NDCs by developing countries. Bolivia stated that developing countries' contributions would be dependent upon support received from developed countries.

Tuvalu said intended NDCs are part of the analytical process leading to the 2015 agreement, should focus on mitigation, and that support for developing them should not be confused with a broader discussion of finance for mitigation and adaptation, among others.

On *information to be included in NDCs*, Norway called for contributions to include the basic facts, including the emissions pledge, the base year, the percentage of national emissions covered, and the role of LULUCF and carbon credits.

Canada recommended contributions be accompanied by sufficient information to understand how they contribute to the overall mitigation effort.

Colombia called for a Lima decision on a common format for mitigation contributions and the information required from parties, adding that this information will be subject to CBDR.

The EU called for agreeing on the requirements for upfront information since different commitments might have inherent uncertainty and the need for parties to explain "why their offer is a fair one." Brazil said NDCs must provide in a clear, transparent

and verifiable manner their intentions regarding provision of finance, including the amount from public sources and demonstrating additionality to official development assistance (ODA), while developing countries should state the extent to which their actions are dependent on international support.

The Russian Federation called for clarity on assumptions for the elaboration of contributions, emphasizing the need for an appropriate format to capture commitments that is flexible enough to reflect various types of quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, EE targets and RE.

Trinidad and Tobago said it would not be desirable for parties to pick and choose elements to be included. With New Zealand, he said common matrices should be adopted and applied to all contributions. Emphasizing the need for transparency, New Zealand said a common template should be used and *ex ante* information should include: expected emission reductions to be achieved; and information on type of targets, underpinned by time period, base year or methodologies, and sectors and gases covered. She noted that upfront information should highlight assumptions and conditions and the role of international markets and LULUCF. She called for considering the minimum parameters required for NDCs.

Mexico said NDCs should be quantifiable and include a complete description of actions to be carried out with clear indicators.

On *review of NDCs*, Turkey called for a robust peer review mechanism of the contributions, and underscored the key role of EE and RE in mitigation.

Bangladesh called for considering how to cover the gap if the received contributions fall short of reaching the 2°C goal.

Colombia called for an internationally agreed framework to define NDCs, underscoring the need for their comparison and assessment and ensure environmental integrity. South Africa underscored the need for *ex ante* and *ex post* review of the contributions, and suggested building on existing accounting rules. The US pointed to the need to set a common end-year for the contributions.

The African Group said that in Lima they expect decisions to be adopted on guidelines and a process for determining *ex ante* transparency and *ex ante* assessment of contributions and support. He said a review process should form an integral part of the new agreement. Japan emphasized the need for upfront information and an *ex ante* consultation and review process. The EU stated that MRV accounting and compliance should be part of the regime.

Mexico supported a strong but not burdensome MRV framework and a systematic evaluation framework that allows for *ex post* review. He said upfront information should consist of what countries can do on their own and how that can be enhanced with support.

FINANCE, TECHNOLOGY AND CAPACITY BUILDING: This item was considered on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, in discussions facilitated by ADP Co-Chairs Runge-Metzger and Kumarsingh. Parties were requested to consider how MOI could be reflected in the 2015 agreement, building on what has been achieved so far.

AIALAC argued that NDCs should be anchored in the new legally-binding agreement and, with AOSIS, noted they should include provisions on MOI. Colombia said the new agreement should: be legally binding; catalyze enhanced MOI; and mainstream climate change considerations into all policies and investments.

Saudi Arabia, with Kuwait, said he is “allergic” to lumping technology, finance and capacity building together under the heading of MOI, adding that they should each be allocated enough time.

Cuba called for building on the Bali Action Plan and for clarifying how finance, technology and capacity building are going to be supported. Noting that consideration of MOI is “lagging behind,” Algeria called for building on existing commitments and institutional arrangements. She underlined the importance of clear accounting rules and addressing financing for adaptation.

Switzerland, Bangladesh and Palau said all countries able to do so should provide an indication of MOI. Timor Leste underscored the obligation of developed parties, as outlined in the Convention, to provide financial and technical support to vulnerable countries.

On **climate finance**, China proposed annexing specific amounts to be provided by developed countries over a specified timeframe to the GCF in the 2015 agreement. The Philippines and Malawi, for the LDCs, underscored the importance of financial and technical support for developing countries to make their NDCs. The Philippines, with India, called for clarity of support to build trust among parties.

The Republic of Korea, for the EIG, said the agreement should: present a clear vision of the provision of MOI; include a vision for scaling up MOI; include provisions on the financial mechanism including the GCF; include a transparency system for support; and emphasize recipient country ownership as an important guiding principle for providing MOI.

Ecuador called for linkages with the GCF, and for the Fund to support the preparation by developing countries of their NDCs. AOSIS urged clear reporting and accounting rules for private finance. The US indicated its support for an OECD initiative to track climate finance, and pointed to efforts aimed at enhancing public and private climate finance.

Ecuador referred to its proposal in the AWG-LCA on MRV of support, stressing its current relevance. Japan underscored the need for clarity and transparency on climate finance, stressing the importance of enabling environments in recipient countries.

The African Group said pre-2020 finance is the cornerstone of an ambitious 2015 agreement and that 1.5% of global GDP should be used as a basis for determining climate finance. He noted the need for a mechanism to assess resources needed to achieve the 2°C target.

The US argued that contributions only refer to mitigation and not to support. He added that mitigation commitments should not be contingent upon support, but that parties could indicate additional actions they could take with support.

Switzerland argued that historical responsibility is not an adequate concept for guiding the discussions on financing, stressing that Switzerland’s historical emissions are quite small

and arguing instead for basing support on present capacity and responsibility.

Australia said the new agreement should build on current gains, highlighting the importance of creating enabling environments, leveraging private finance, and prioritizing adaptation finance.

Grenada urged agreement on the definition of climate finance, pointing to the categorization of ODA and humanitarian assistance as climate flows. He called for, *inter alia*, “anchoring” the US\$100 billion long-term finance pledge in the new agreement and researching indigenous SIDS technology.

On **technology**, China stated that barriers, including intellectual property rights (IPRs), should be removed and suggested establishing an international mechanism on IPRs. He said a special window within the GCF should be established for technology development and transfer and called for a provision on research and development (R&D) cooperation.

Uganda, for LDCs, underlined the importance of full operationalization of the Technology Mechanism (TM). He called for the provision of long-term support for implementation of the TM and further elaboration of linkages between the TEC and the CTCN. He said the new agreement should facilitate use of technology needs assessments as the basis for addressing technology needs of LDCs. Turkey called for building on the TEC and the CTCN, and linking technology to existing financial institutions. India said the TEC and the CTCN do not adequately facilitate the transfer of climate technologies. He added that the GCF could provide a technology transfer window.

Bangladesh stated that NDCs will help determine the costs of these actions and, with India and South Africa, pointed to the climate funding gap. Turkey said the allocation of the resources through the GCF should be flexible. The EU stressed the importance of mobilizing private and public flows, and creating enabling environments.

Colombia stressed the need for a system-wide approach. The African Group noted that the 2015 agreement should contain provisions for assessing the TM in the context of support for implementing adaptation and mitigation measures. Noting that IPRs reside with the private sector, he expressed concern with transferring the obligation for technology development and deployment to this sector. Saudi Arabia lamented the focus on private sector action, calling for a focus on public action. Switzerland and AOSIS called for building on the existing TM.

On **capacity building**, the LDCs said it should be a central element of the 2015 agreement, and highlighted mainstreaming gender considerations. Turkey noted the cross-cutting nature of capacity building, adding that it should be country-driven. The EU underlined that capacity building can help mainstream climate change concerns in public investment strategies.

China observed that capacity building should be demand-driven, based on needs of developing countries, and include specific and quantified commitments. He proposed the establishment of an international capacity-building mechanism funded by the GCF.

The Philippines drew attention to education and awareness raising, systematic observations, and the mitigation co-benefits of adaptation.

The African Group called for a coordinated approach to strengthening effective adaptation and mitigation actions. He said capacity building should be treated as a stand-alone issue in the new agreement, and called for an articulation of contributions towards capacity building and the role of a capacity-building committee.

MITIGATION: On Thursday, Co-Chair Runge-Metzger stressed the importance of addressing mitigation at the scale required to stay below the 2°C limit of acceptable warming, and consider how to reflect this in the new agreement.

On the *definition of the mitigation framework*, AOSIS stressed that the 2015 agreement should include the global 1.5°C goal and necessary information on the aggregate of emissions. Grenada proposed that the new agreement be guided by science on actions required to achieve the 1.5-2°C target and integrate scientific findings. Mexico called for devising a dynamic framework based on development, capacity and scientific findings.

Kuwait noted that in addition to differentiation, there must be appropriate sequencing in the new agreement with developed countries taking the lead on mitigation and developing countries following with enhanced actions.

Japan said all parties have an obligation to present NDCs, but major economies should present economy-wide targets so that a level playing field is assured. Brazil underlined differentiation among mitigation efforts as key to fostering ambition and avoiding back tracking. Brazil, Timor Leste, Sudan, for the African Group, and Tuvalu said Annex I parties should present ambitious economy-wide emission reduction pledges, while non-Annex I parties could put forward contributions based on a set of options. The US said mitigation efforts should include NDCs, upfront information, and a consultative period to provide transparency.

China said mitigation in the new agreement should, *inter alia*: promote the conservation of sinks and reservoirs; be differentiated, with developed countries taking the lead in economy-wide targets in accordance with historical responsibility, which would be inscribed in a template-based or common tabular format annex; and inscribe developing country actions in an annex to the agreement.

AILAC highlighted the need to address: the global mitigation goal through the application of CBDR and respective capabilities; a mechanism to determine NDCs in a legally-binding form to ensure that it is applicable to all; and clarity on basic information to be provided. Algeria recalled the findings of IPCC Working Group I (physical science), adding that binding commitments could lead to slowed growth and lack of development in developing countries, stressing the need for finance and technology transfer.

On the *nature and content of NDCs*, Iran stated that NDCs should address all elements of the Durban mandate, not only mitigation. Papua New Guinea said mitigation in developing countries cannot be considered in isolation.

Tuvalu said NDCs should focus on mitigation, and with Papua New Guinea and Algeria, added that some developing parties will require support to define and implement their contributions.

New Zealand observed that not every action, programme or commitment should be conditional on support.

The Republic of Korea said all NDCs should have the same legal nature while allowing for flexibility to enhance broad participation. With the US, he added that countries should explain why their contribution is fair given their national circumstances. Australia observed that parties should submit information on: the definition of their NDCs; expected impact of NDCs; and whether the markets or land sector would be used in their NDCs. Norway emphasized the need to define upfront information and for common matrices for quantification.

On *other elements of the mitigation framework*, Saudi Arabia emphasized the importance of including impacts of response measures in the new agreement. He recognized mitigation co-benefits for sustainable development and called for building on existing institutions.

Calling for clarity on what “enhancing” means, the Philippines stressed the existing commitment of developed countries to provide technology on beneficial terms and to show leadership in modifying long-term trends, such as unsustainable consumption and production.

Papua New Guinea indicated he looked forward to the ADP technical meeting in June on REDD+, stressing the need to import progress achieved so far on this issue into the new agreement.

On the *review of commitments*, Grenada called for: a monitoring and reporting component to evaluate individual party’s commitments and their impact on the aggregate goal, and a process for updating contributions and commitments in line with scientific findings.

Switzerland said mitigation commitments should be formulated in a manner that prevents double counting. AILAC called for a process to allow NDCs to be anchored in the new agreement and for a review mechanism to assess contributions.

The Philippines said the agreement must have a strong MRV provision for finance, technology and capacity building, while stressing the increasingly urgent need for adaptation in light of the current impacts of climate change as a component of enhanced action.

New Zealand noted that the first round of NDCs may not be sufficient to achieve the 2°C goal and suggested including in the agreement a mechanism for increasing ambition over time.

Ethiopia, for the LDCs, called for a balance between the initial level of commitments and a review process to reach more ambitious contributions, adding that commitments should be taken on over a five-year period.

Norway called for determining the levels of quantification necessary to aggregate long-term efforts.

The US said *ex ante* clarity is critical to understand the collective level of ambition. Brazil called for establishing a contribution review process based on science and equity. Tuvalu urged a review process in the lead up to Paris.

Tuvalu cautioned against holding off on commitments until accounting rules are agreed, pointing to the delays experienced in establishing the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The African Group pointed to its proposed principles-based reference framework, stressing the importance of an *ex*

ante process to assess the adequacy of commitments. Australia called for the preparation of regular, complete and accurate inventories, using matrices and methodologies based on the latest scientific guidance.

EQUITY AND AMBITION: On Thursday, ADP Co-Chair Kumarsingh called on delegates to consider the operationalization of equity and CBDR in the new agreement, and the means of ensuring that equity acts as an enabler of ambition. He also noted the need for a concrete discussion of a framework for assessment and how the Convention's principles will be applied in the new agreement.

On *equity*, the EU called for agreement by Lima on the upfront information to be provided by parties on their NDCs, adding that this information would explain why the contributions are fair. He said NDCs should be legally binding although their nature could vary according to parties' circumstances. Switzerland called for an understanding of the intended NDCs in the context of quantified emission reductions. He also identified the need to understand the effort behind each commitment and whether aggregate contributions add up to the common objective. India stressed that a framework that redistributes the ambition gap to developing countries is unacceptable.

Tuvalu, for LDCs, reaffirmed the fundamental role of equity and CBDR principles, stressing that they should strengthen and not undermine the new regime. India warned that if developed countries fail to meet their pre-2020 obligations, they will undermine equity post-2020.

China said equity is about developing countries having the opportunity to achieve sustainable development. He questioned whether the 2015 agreement would: recognize differentiation between developing and developed countries in terms of historical responsibility; recognize the development needs of developing countries and reflect their circumstances and capacities; and reflect developed countries' leading role in mitigation and support based on historical responsibility, capabilities and advantages. Bangladesh said equity does not mean compromising the right to survival.

South Africa called for operationalizing the principles of fairness and reconciling science with historic responsibility, current realities and development needs.

On *ambition*, Nauru urged all parties to make contributions, recognizing that some will require support in order to do so. India said the historical responsibility of developed countries should provide the basis for their mitigation obligations, stressing that his country's overriding priority is inclusive development and poverty eradication. Chile, for AILAC, said the Group has been leading by example by making voluntary commitments, while stressing that historical responsibility is key. The EU argued that COP 21 should be preceded by a transparent and facilitative assessment process to understand how the NDCs help reach the global temperature goal. He added that this process could lead some parties to raise their ambition. Nepal, for the LDCs, underscored the importance of comparability of efforts and establishing a compliance regime in the 2015 agreement. Guatemala, for AILAC, said NDCs need to be assessed and evaluated in a multilateral rules-based system. South Africa proposed: a multilateral process based on science and

fairness; an *ex ante* assessment procedure to close the ambition gap; agreement to provide an *ex post* process and mid-term review; and a provision for automatic, upward adjustment of contributions.

TRANSPARENCY OF ACTION AND SUPPORT: On Thursday, ADP Co-Chair Kumarsingh outlined some elements emerging from previous discussions on this topic, noting that parties see benefit in building on existing transparency mechanisms, and agree on the essential role of MRV in building a robust, transparent and durable regime. He encouraged delegates to address how the 2015 agreement can build on existing transparency arrangements and what new arrangements may be needed.

On *transparency and trust*, Nauru, for AOSIS, the EU, Norway, Turkey and China underlined the key role played by transparency in building trust among parties, with the Philippines and Norway adding that transparency enables the assessment of aggregate progress towards the global goal of the Convention. China emphasized transparency should ensure implementation of the Convention, stressing the required leadership of developed countries. Turkey emphasized transparency and accountability play a central role in building trust among parties, stressing a comprehensive framework is essential and should enable evaluation of whether individual contributions are fair and feasible. New Zealand, supported by Switzerland, highlighted confidence, clarity and consistency as requirements.

Brazil cautioned against re-opening negotiations that created the recently-established transparency framework. He emphasized the outcomes of the Bali Action Plan on transparency should be anchored in the agreement stressing transparency is an overarching concept applying to all elements of the agreement and NDCs.

Marshall Islands called for a transparency framework applicable to all, with a tiered system that recognizes national circumstances.

On *information on NDCs*, AOSIS and the EU encouraged focus on the definition of information to be provided by parties on their NDCs to enable comparability. The EU added that parties should explain why their NDC is fair. New Zealand said clarity on assumptions underpinning contributions was important before locking down commitments.

Japan noted the timeframe for submitting NDCs and said the upfront composition of the NDCs is important for transparency. South Africa emphasized defining the minimum information to be presented in NDCs. Marshall Islands said the information provided in NDCs should enable assessment and aggregation of the commitments.

On *MRV and the rules-based system*, Saint Lucia said the quality of Annex I inventories should improve over time and, with Malawi, for the LDCs, called for supporting non-Annex I parties in adhering to higher standards of reporting. She stressed that tools used under the Kyoto Protocol provide good examples to draw upon. The Philippines drew attention to timelines and financial support for national communications, underlining the importance of *ex ante* need-based financing.

While noting the value of a common accounting system, Norway stressed that parties will have different mitigation

commitments that call for flexibility. Norway and the EU underlined the need for common rules on the use of carbon markets. The EU suggested using IPCC methodologies and streamlining MRV arrangements to make them more efficient.

The LDCs urged adopting MRV requirements no less stringent than those agreed under the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I parties. Bangladesh called for a robust MRV framework and the assessment of *ex ante* information.

China said developed countries should be subject to enhanced versions of existing MRV frameworks and that transparency for developing countries must account for national circumstances, in a manner that is non-punitive and respectful of national sovereignty.

The EU underscored the need to go “beyond transparency” and establish a compliance system to hold parties accountable. Turkey said the framework should have a degree of flexibility and avoid applying all rules to all parties in all circumstances, as this would delay action.

Canada proposed a post-2020 MRV system, either established by a decision or in the body of the agreement, include: an inventory updated on a regular basis; updated reports on targets; clear accounting provisions on land and market mechanisms; and a system of review of contributions. She said the key question is how to adapt the current system to the post-2020 environment, noting a number of questions still remain as MRV implementation is relatively new.

Chile and the Marshall Islands said the new regime should build on existing arrangements. Chile called for a unified MRV system for action and support, differentiated based on capability.

South Africa called for creating a system for *ex ante* assessment of the intended contributions for adequacy and fairness, allowing for peer review of the contributions, and a process for adjusting contributions upward in a non-threatening and non-prescriptive manner. She called for improving the *ex post* system of MRV to eliminate double counting, and for developing rules on MRV of support and finance. New Zealand, Saudi Arabia and the US said the new agreement should build on the existing MRV system, with New Zealand calling for a common framework with built-in flexibility to accommodate the full spectrum of economic development.

The US said contributions should be reflected in a schedule, and actions inscribed reported and reviewed at regular intervals. He highlighted reporting, technical review and a facilitated party driven process as three features for transparency.

On **markets**, Japan called for avoiding double counting when using market mechanisms. New Zealand said it was important to determine how parties account for progress in achieving targets if they are using the land sector or markets. She called for transparency on the types of units generated on carbon markets and for measures to avoid double counting.

The LDCs and the Philippines called for a definition of **climate finance**. Ecuador recalled their submission on transparency of climate finance, stressing only funds that are entirely aimed at addressing climate change should be counted towards obligations on climate finance, while leveraged funds would be considered complementary. He called for establishing a climate finance registry to promote transparency.

To advance transparency of support in post-2020, the US proposed: reflecting the growing number of donors providing support; and placing greater emphasis on effectiveness of finance and what interventions are having the best impact. Bangladesh noted the need for specific rules to address transparency of action and support. The Marshall Islands emphasized the need for support and collaboration to assist developing countries in implementing a transparency and accounting framework applicable to all.

OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO ELEMENTS: This item was introduced by Co-Chair Runge-Metzger on Thursday, with discussions continuing on Friday. Runge-Metzger said the discussions should address issues not considered elsewhere, *inter alia*: the adverse impacts of response measures; market mechanisms and non-market mechanisms; integrated approaches to adaptation and mitigation; and a compliance mechanism.

On **organization of work**, China said response measures and market and non-market based mechanisms could be addressed under elements of mitigations and/or finance.

The EU recommended that the ADP focus on its mandate from Warsaw, in particular the review of NDCs, while noting the value of addressing some other arrangements, such as the entrance into force of the agreement, amendment procedures, and the role of the COP and the Secretariat. The US agreed that the ADP’s work should be focused.

South Africa also called for examining the legal nature of the 2015 agreement and suggested that the Secretariat prepare a synthesis paper on the level of ambition and gap once all the NDCs have been submitted.

On **market and non-market based mechanisms**, Bolivia stressed that markets are not an effective means of addressing climate change, recalling their proposal to institute a precautionary moratoria on new market mechanisms.

A majority of parties agreed that market and non-market based mechanisms should be included in the new agreement. The EU said market based mechanisms are an effective way to increase mitigation ambition. Papua New Guinea called for mainstreaming climate change in the global economy and for putting a price on carbon and promoting innovative public-private partnerships. AILAC said market based mechanisms must include incentives for driving action and catalyzing ambition at scale.

AILAC and Brazil expressed concern on overreliance on market mechanisms to achieve the climate goal. Turkey underlined the need for these measures to ensure enhanced mitigation, environmental integrity, and incentives for the private sector, as well as avoid fragmentation.

While stressing that most mitigation must be undertaken domestically, LDCs noted that market based mechanisms could be used in some cases. He said any new mechanisms should ensure LDC access and be subject to international verification and oversight. South Africa recommended not repeating the existing rules in the new agreement, but allow for market based mechanisms to be utilized.

Bolivia proposed establishing a platform for non-market based approaches under the Convention, including: a joint mitigation and adaptation mechanism for the sustainable management

of forests; a global mechanism for funding national feed-in tariff systems; and a mechanism on response measures. LDCs said non-market based mechanisms include a broad range of approaches and are a major contribution.

On a **compliance mechanism**, China said discussion of a compliance mechanism is premature. LDCs called for incorporation of an effective compliance system.

Tuvalu called for the compliance system to review the MRV of mitigation and financial efforts. With AILAC, he suggested establishing a facilitative branch to assist developing countries in non-compliance through capacity-building initiatives.

Brazil called for using the compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol as a starting point. AILAC added that the mechanism should include compelling measures to pressure those not making the required effort to comply.

Stressing the importance of compliance, Bangladesh warned against introducing so much flexibility into the legally binding agreement that it becomes “a gentlemen’s agreement.”

On **response measures**, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran called for addressing the economic and social consequences of response measures in the new agreement. Turkey highlighted the trade effects of response measures. Iran called for referencing the obligations of developed countries on MOI.

On **loss and damage**, AILAC underscored the need for the new agreement to address loss and damage, building on the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage.

On **NDCs**, South Africa said while contributions will be nationally determined, there should be a top-down review. She underscored the importance of agreeing in Lima on the information to be included in NDCs, which should cover mitigation, adaptation and MOI.

TECHNICAL EXPERT MEETINGS

TECHNICAL EXPERT MEETING ON RENEWABLE ENERGY: The technical expert meeting on RE, facilitated by Youba Sokona, African Climate Policy Center, UN Economic Commission for Africa, took place on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday.

Session 1: Policies, Practices and Technology - Global

State of Play: ADP Co-Chair Runge-Metzger invited delegates to look at unlocking mitigation opportunities in the RE sector, noting the importance of seeing greater visibility of the results on the ground of this technical process.

Nick Nuttall, UNFCCC Secretariat, highlighted strategies to enhance the visibility of mitigation action by updating the UNFCCC website. He also drew attention to: films being shown at the conference venue; Figueres’ speeches; the use of social media; the Momentum for Change Initiative; and the need to translate the UNFCCC website into more languages.

Dolf Gielen, International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), indicated that 18% of the global energy mix is RE, underlining that the uptake of RE can be driven by increased energy access, cost abatement opportunities, reduced subsidies costs, job creation opportunities, and health benefits. He pointed to “Remap 2030,” an IRENA roadmap that analyzes how the RE market share can be doubled by 2030.

Griffin Thompson, US, indicated that the US aims to generate 80% of its electricity from a diverse set of clean energy sources

while accelerating the diffusion of RE. He noted that, since 2008, the US doubled RE generation, underlining the importance of price reductions.

Xiang Gao, China, emphasized the geographical imbalance of RE uptake across China, and stressed the challenges posed by non-continuous sources of RE, such as wind and solar. He called for enhanced international technical and financial cooperation to increase RE deployment.

In response to questions from the floor, Thompson explained that the 80% target refers to clean energy, which includes a wider scope of energy sources than RE. He stressed the importance of considering the variability and intermittency of RE, interconnection and battery storage.

Fatuma Hussein, Kenya, described the policy and legal framework for RE in Kenya, outlining barriers to RE deployment and benefits of RE uptake, including: improved health; income and employment generation; climate change mitigation; foreign exchange savings generation; and increased energy security.

Jennifer de Brum, Marshall Islands, noted the RE sector is a win-win for Pacific SIDS as it reduces fossil fuel dependence. She identified barriers to RE uptake, including: lack of affordable finance; threats to grid stability; lack of national capacity for planning, installing and maintaining infrastructure; and navigating different donor priorities.

In ensuing discussion, delegates addressed, *inter alia*: the challenges presented by different local circumstances; the relevance of the UNFCCC process in meeting RE objectives on the ground; the importance of partnerships; and the role of the TEC and the CTCN.

José Domingos Gonzalez Miguez, Brazil, said the challenge was to ensure long-term sustainable development while maintaining a high level of renewable resource use. He noted that bioenergy provides 25% of the national energy mix and the use of ethanol allows Brazil to avoid the equivalent of 44 million tons of CO₂ emissions per year.

Sara Nabil Baashan, Saudi Arabia, highlighted priorities, including: diversifying the economy; adapting to adverse impact of response measures; addressing water resource and water security issues; adapting to climate change; and combating desertification. She emphasized that the main criteria for selecting energy technologies are their economic and technical feasibility, and their fit within the hydrocarbon profile.

Tewelde Berhan Gebre Egziabher, Ethiopia, highlighted RE projects, observing that green growth is a necessity but must address land degradation, which threatens millions of citizens with poverty. He said Ethiopia aims to be a zero net emitter by 2025 and the electricity grid is currently derived entirely from RE.

Andrés Pirazzoli, Chile, stated that currently 5.9% of the grid in his country is RE, noting the large potential for renewables. Stressing that the focus had been on large centrally-connected energy producers, he said the challenge is to shift towards small-scale distributors, helped by smart grids.

Karsten Sach, Germany, highlighted three energy pillars: RE, EE, and the future grid (flexible grids, enlarged grid capacities, integration of renewables). He observed that Germany is on track to achieve its ambitious targets, while noting the need for an

integrated policy for the decarbonization of electricity, heating and transport.

Discussions addressed: the importance of bilateral cooperation, including South-South cooperation, transboundary impacts of RE development, successful models of RE deployment, and the integration of biogas into sugar production.

Session 2: Implementing Actions: Finance, Technology and Capacity Building: Roland Roesch, IRENA, underscored that RE is increasingly competitive. He identified challenges, including that: traditional investors are unlikely to provide the scale of finance needed; unpredictable policies and regulatory uncertainty are main barriers to new investments; and private investors consider the investment risk in the RE sector as comparably higher than others.

Luis Gomez-Echeverri, Sustainable Energy for All Initiative (SE4All), emphasized the importance of collaborative action and partnerships, outlining the objectives of SE4All. He stressed that partnerships cut across a range of sustainable development issues on the demand side.

Marcelo Jordan, GCF Secretariat, presented the status of the establishment of the Fund. On the readiness work programme, he identified priorities, such as: establishment of designated national authorities; strategic frameworks, including or building on NAMAs and NAPs; and an initial pipeline of projects and programme proposals.

Jukka Uosukainen, CTCN, outlined the structure and functions of the CTCN. He said its main function is to assist developing countries, and respond to specific requests from designated national entities. On RE, he said CTCN has a menu of resources related to technology transfer.

Jarl Krausing, World Bank, highlighted the Bank's RE funding portfolio and its evolution from 2004-2013. He identified challenges in leveraging private financing and reducing risk, facilitating market entry, and introducing investment-grade policy instruments for transparency, certainty and longevity.

Frank Jésus, Global Environment Facility (GEF) Secretariat, addressed ideas on scaling up RE, highlighting lessons learned, including: reducing investment risks through improved and stabilized policies, regulations and contractual frameworks; working on the price premium if needed; addressing quality and standardization of hardware and software; and identifying capacity-building needs, especially for mini-grids.

Maryke van Staden, ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability, examined leadership by local governments, noting the need to identify which cases are replicable. She called for creating enabling frameworks that support climate and energy action by local governments.

Discussions addressed, *inter alia*: business models; RE dissemination; globally-funded feed-in tariffs; and concrete ways to develop projects in island countries.

Session 3: Discussion on the Way Forward: Participants discussed policy options to induce RE actions, how international organizations and non-state actors can help countries put frameworks and policies in place to enhance action on the ground and next steps in the process.

David Copper, UK, outlined UK support channeled through international climate funds, saying catalyzing change requires

scale, replicability and leverage to drive private money into climate investments.

Niclas Hällström, What Next Forum, presented a "Global Marshall Plan" to tackle both climate and development, highlighting the demonstrated effectiveness of RE feed-in tariffs (REFITs).

Iran, Indonesia, Mali and Bangladesh discussed the specific context of RE deployment in their respective countries.

The EU underscored five categories of outcomes from UNFCCC engagement through COP decisions or registries: new and ambitious policies emerging from countries themselves; integration into domestic preparations for NDCs; opportunities to expand partnerships; signals and guidance to investors, both public and private; and a pipeline of projects and programmes eligible for funding.

China emphasized the need to contextualize discussions under workstream 2 to enhance ambition pre-2020. He called for comprehensive policies to make the RE sector sustainable. Saudi Arabia reiterated that countries should reflect on whether they can bring a particular technology up to a sustainable level.

Dolf Gielen, IRENA, responded to comments on REFITs and noted the possibility of regional R&D. Luis Gomez-Echeverri, SE4All, said investments only make sense if they align with countries' sustainable development priorities.

The US emphasized the importance of experimentation, noting the necessity of new business models, policies and frameworks. Nauru noted the need to internalize external costs, saying REFITs are revolutionary in that they change the energy mix and democratize the energy sector. Kenya said pre-2020 action plays a key role in building trust in the post-2020 arrangement.

On access to finance, Jarl Krausing, World Bank, highlighted established processes for accessing finance. Frank Jésus, GEF, said access depends on pressure applied by specific governments. Copper stated that availability of finance is less important than establishing a pipeline of bankable projects, suggesting use, *inter alia*, of the NAMA Facility and the Climate and Development Knowledge Network.

Mali called for a holistic approach to addressing bottlenecks in accessing finance. Krausing noted the need to find ways to work with partners to address countries that have reached lending limits. Marcelo Jordan, GCF Secretariat, discussed additional modalities for direct access to the GCF. Uosukainen said the CTCN is growing fast to respond to developing country needs.

On how to move forward, Nauru said the main question is how to address barriers to deployment of mitigation opportunities in developed and developing countries.

The US called for capturing the extensive global panoply of projects, programmes and partnerships to encourage action. He suggested the TEC be tasked with continuing the current dialogue.

Mali stressed the technical expert meeting platform under workstream 2 is very important and will also feed into post-2020 ambition, calling for it to become permanent.

TECHNICAL EXPERT MEETING ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY: The technical expert meeting on EE convened on Wednesday and Thursday, facilitated by Jun Arima (Japan).

Session 1: Policies, Practices and Technology - Global

State of Play: Brian Mantlana, South Africa, presented on the governance structure for EE in South Africa, stressing the importance of a strong policy framework, stakeholder participation, vertical alignment with actors at all levels, and institutional capacity building.

Toshiaki Nagata, Japan, outlined efforts by industry in Japan to reduce energy consumption, noting the success of labeling schemes. He drew attention to the need to reduce energy consumption in the consumer and transport sectors.

José Manuel Sandoval, Colombia, presented on EE measures in Colombia within the framework of its low-carbon strategy. He underscored the need to: reinforce the win-win approach of EE measures; create innovative financial tools; and strengthen capacity and enhance R&D.

Leong-Kok Su-Ming, Singapore, described Singapore's target to green 80% of buildings by 2030 and the establishment of the Green Mark scheme, a green building rating system to evaluate a building for its environmental impact and performance.

Peter Bach, Denmark, highlighted strong EE improvements, including decoupling energy use from economic growth. He noted the role of building codes and voluntary EE agreements with industry, which can provide rebates on the CO₂ tax, if implemented, emphasizing the need for a combination of measures.

Bhaskar Sarma, India, emphasized increasing energy demand in India. He pointed to earlier EE investments due to the high price of energy, highlighting the government's regulatory response to market failures in the appliance, building and industrial sectors. He said challenges include: difficulty in predicting outcomes; benchmarking; human and institutional capacity; enforcement and monitoring; and high upfront costs of many EE technologies.

Philippe Benoit, International Energy Agency (IEA), outlined a range of EE policy recommendations and identified six key poles for action, including: minimum energy performance standards; information and awareness; designation of EE responsibility and capacity building; finance; better data; and technology development.

Thibaud Voïta, International Partnership for EE Cooperation (IPEEC), described the Partnership, highlighting that it provides a forum for discussing EE policies, practices and technologies. He discussed ways in which IPEEC can support the UNFCCC, including through creating linkages between NAMAs and EE.

During discussions on country experiences, participants addressed: consumer incentives to encourage EE; the use of carbon intensity versus energy intensity indicators; barriers to EE, such as market failure; and the creation of an EE registry under the UNFCCC to capture options.

Participants also addressed the importance of: standardization for EE, including the work of the International Organization for Standardization; finance to retrofit private sector buildings; North-South and South-South cooperation; and partner matching, and the possible facilitative role of the UNFCCC process.

Session 2: Implementing Actions: Finance, Technology and Capacity Building: On Thursday morning, Frank Jesús, GEF, outlined models for scaling up EE, saying successful

programmes combine measures to address market failures and targeted policies.

Curt Garrigan, UNEP, discussed the enlighten initiative, a public-private partnership to phase-in compact fluorescent light bulbs, describing the importance of multi-stakeholder representation and demonstrating benefits.

Jan-Willem van de Ven, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, noted the Bank's Sustainable Energy Initiative, saying successes stem from mainstreaming EE, enabling regulations and providing technical assistance.

Jarl Krausing, World Bank, outlined the Bank's EE portfolio for the period 2004-2013, identifying lessons learned, including the importance of: getting the price right; good governance; sustained commitment, monitoring and evaluation; and joint public-private action.

Cornie Huizenga, Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport (SLoCaT), noted that transport is responsible for 25% of GHG emissions. He described SLoCaT's work on: modeling; supporting NAMA development; developing MRV procedures for the transport sector; and examining climate finance.

Terri Wills, C40 Cities – Climate Leadership Group, said the initiative consists of 66 of the world's mega cities. She explained that C40 enables the sharing of success stories among cities and that solutions are identified according to local circumstances.

Luis Gomez-Echeverri, SE4All, highlighted the organization as a global platform for EE. He explained that targets include ensuring universal access to modern energy services, doubling the use of RE in the global energy mix, and doubling the rate of improvement in EE.

During discussions, participants addressed: awareness of partnerships and initiatives; initiatives engaged in EE; and benefits, shortcomings, and areas for improvement in the uptake of EE measures.

Session 3: Discussions on the Way Forward: Participants considered the way forward, focusing on the role of international cooperation and how to enhance EE potential so that it can be translated into mitigation. Suggestions included: providing signals and guidance to investors by disseminating the outcomes of the meeting; designing projects that are eligible for support; feeding the outputs of the meeting into the ADP ministerial session in June; using the TM to move the agenda forward; requesting the TM, TEC and CTCN to work with various international organizations to articulate major themes that could be taken up by the technical expert meeting in June; strengthening institutions within the UNFCCC designed to address technology; recognizing the passive nature of the NAMA registry and TT:Clear, and adopting a more proactive approach to EE; and mobilizing champions to drive EE programmes.

CLOSING OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERT MEETINGS: On Friday, Co-Chair Runge-Metzger welcomed active engagement by parties and experts. RE Facilitator Sokona reported that discussions on the way forward included suggestions, *inter alia*, to: make use of existing platforms, such as the NAMA registry to implement policy options; ensure active engagement of the TM, TEC and CTCN; and invite continued engagement by IRENA and others in the technical expert meeting process.

EE Facilitator Arima summarized discussions and noted the need to continue the dialogue. He said parties suggested, *inter alia*: continued involvement of IEA and others in the technical expert meeting process; the definition of a holistic and integrated approach to EE; efforts to test and adopt technological options; better understanding processes related to EE at the national level; and the use of the existing NAMA registry, including links to a financial mechanism.

ADP Co-Chair Runge-Metzger said opportunities for action exist in order to turn RE and EE mitigation potential into reality. He noted the need to enhance the visibility of actions and experiences of parties, international organizations and partnerships, and that the Secretariat is exploring how to do this through the technical expert meetings.

Bangladesh noted limitations of the process, saying some best practices have yet to be showcased, especially from LDCs, and calling for more balanced representation. With Nepal, he asked how to incorporate recommendations from the technical expert meeting into the architecture of the UNFCCC.

South Africa said taking forward many of the recommendations from the technical expert meetings would require a more formal session to allow party input.

Nauru, for AOSIS, called for the experts meetings in June to be better structured to allow more discussion with experts. He supported calls for an additional day for RE and EE during the June session. He said the technical paper mandated in Warsaw should include an executive summary highlighting key opportunities and barriers, as well as strategies for overcoming them.

The EU said the meeting had been positive, the presentation of country-specific instances helpful, adding that there would be value in including a broader variety of investors in discussions.

The US supported additional work on EE and RE, including a wider range of stakeholders. He called for considering how parties can harness sub-national action to catalyze greater ambition.

China emphasized that the technical expert meeting is an event and not a new process. On future planning, he said workstream 2 should be a formal discussion and not just an informal expert process without interpretation, which had hampered full participation.

WORKSHOP ON DOMESTIC PREPARATIONS FOR INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS

On Tuesday, Co-Chair Kumarsingh opened the workshop. The EU outlined their proposal, main elements of which include a 40% GHG emissions reduction-target by 2030, to be met by each EU country individually, and at least 27% RE by 2030, at the EU level. He said next steps include consideration of the 2030 framework by the European Council and its communication as a contribution to COP 20.

China outlined elements to determine NDCs, proposing developed countries, *inter alia*: undertake economy-wide quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments on a binding basis demonstrating leadership; provide finance and technological support for adaptation in developing countries; and fulfill financial commitments for 2020 and enhance provision

of public funds beyond 2020, based on the US\$100 billion pledge. He proposed developing countries, *inter alia*: enhance diversified mitigation actions; enhance endogenous systematic and institutional capacity and engage local stakeholders in adaptation; and share best practices with local stakeholders to build capacity. He noted that China intends to take actions that change its development path, including through integration of climate targets into national socio-economic development strategies.

Thailand described national energy and transport NAMAs, and underscored the need for adequate support and identification of technological gaps.

Mexico outlined its 2012 climate change law and provided an overview of planned national actions, stressing that Mexico will start with the low-cost and high abatement measures.

Noting his country's high dependence on hydrocarbon exports, Saudi Arabia underscored that it is adapting to both climate change and response measures.

Ghana indicated that his country's contribution to the 2015 agreement is still evolving, describing consultation processes with relevant stakeholders and underlining the challenge of raising the awareness of high-level officials.

Costa Rica outlined national initiatives, including 92% RE generation, reduced deforestation and fossil fuel taxation. He highlighted Carbon Neutral 2021, a voluntary commitment involving the public and private sectors.

On pre-2020 ambition, the US said it is preparing to come forward by the 31 March 2015 deadline with upfront transparent elements relating to its national contribution, including information on timeframe, base year, gases and sectors covered, and overall reductions. On support, he highlighted efforts to develop low-energy development strategies.

The United Arab Emirates observed that actions are being taken in the context of sustainable development focusing on economic diversification. He pointed to efforts to move beyond petroleum by pursuing RE and the safe sustainable use of hydrocarbons.

Trinidad and Tobago outlined actions to increase use of new and innovative technologies and encourage the use of RE. She observed that a carbon reduction strategy for power generation and transport sectors is being developed.

Nepal, for the LDCs, indicated his commitment to strengthen the rules-based regime under the Convention, stressing the need for further clarification on the contents of NDCs.

In the ensuing discussions, Kuwait suggested that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States start internalizing the externalities and the polluter pays principle to decrease emissions in various sectors. Noting Saudi Arabia's suggestion that it has no responsibility to contribute, the EU underscored that some non-Annex I countries are some of the richest and biggest emitters in the world.

In response to a question from Tanzania, the EU indicated that all commitments should be captured in a legally-binding manner in the new agreement. Iran questioned the usefulness of holding workshops, calling for starting "real negotiations" promptly, considering the short timeframe.

CLOSING PLENARY

On Friday, ADP Co-Chair Kumarsingh opened the closing plenary. He observed that the goals of the meeting had been achieved, although there was still work to be done. He said there had been many useful inputs on all areas of work, which signified better understanding of positions, observing that this would be reflected in the Co-Chairs' reflection note on the meeting. He explained that the Co-Chairs were guided by the understanding that negotiating text will be "collectively constructed based on views expressed by parties in their submissions and in the negotiations, which would reflect a truly party-driven process."

Parties agreed to the establishment of a contact group, co-chaired by Runge-Metzger and Kumarsingh. Co-Chair Kumarsingh said the first meeting would take place after the ADP opening session in June. He informed delegates that the process would be: party-driven; built on input from parties; and reflect inputs from parties in any outputs from the process. He called for using the negotiating time efficiently.

Parties also agreed to hold an additional ADP session in October. The Secretariat outlined the financial implications for the additional session noting that €1.5 million would be required and that a suitable venue had been secured around the third week of October. He informed delegates that a high-level ministerial dialogue for enhanced action would take place on Friday, 6 June, preceded by high-level roundtable on increased ambition on Kyoto Protocol commitments on Thursday, 5 June.

Anna Serzysko (Poland), ADP Rapporteur, introduced the draft report (FCCC/ADP.2014/L.1/Rev.1), which was adopted by parties.

Bolivia, for the G-77/China, recalled the urgency to accelerate the current process, welcomed the constitution of the contact group, and requested the ADP Co-Chairs to present a plan of work for the June session and the rest of the year.

Australia, for the Umbrella Group, welcomed progress made during the session under both workstreams and called for focusing on elements of text rather than entering into a detailed compilation exercise, cautioning against adopting a "silo-ed" approach to the thematic elements of the 2015 agreement.

The EU said the June session should focus on making further progress on up-front information requirements for the NDCs and on the definition of the rules-base of the 2015 agreement.

Mexico, for the EIG, urged the inclusion in the cross-cutting issues contained in the 2015 agreement of some fundamentals and principles, including language on the linkages between climate change and human rights, as well as the principle of gender equality.

Sudan, for the African Group, called for: a clear schedule and organization of work for the remainder of 2014; deliverables ahead of Lima; and Annex I parties to raise their level of ambition to 40% below their 1990 levels by 2020 and not 2030.

Nauru, for AOSIS, suggested the June session focus on the further elaboration of the elements of the 2015 agreement, information on NDCs, and a transparent and robust review of the NDCs. He added that loss and damage should be a separate element of the 2015 agreement. Nepal, for LDCs, pointed to the

current lack of leadership and expressed concern over the "lack of enthusiasm" to raise pre-2020 ambition.

Venezuela, for LMDCs, looked forward to working in a structured and formal mode covering both workstreams, focused on all elements. She welcomed participants to the first social pre-COP in November and the preparatory meeting in July.

India, for BASIC, expressed concern with the slow progress, observing that sessions have seen further reiteration of ideas and positions already outlined at roundtables and workshops over the last two years, rather than the initial elaboration of elements of a draft negotiating text.

The Dominican Republic, for the Central American Integration Group, made an urgent appeal to all parties to enter into concrete commitments and actions to bridge the existing ambition gap.

Nicaragua, for ALBA, said he did not agree with the way negotiations had been conducted in Bonn, which he said undermined the principles of multilateralism. He also said there was a lack of ambition on finance, capacity building and technology.

Colombia, for AILAC, outlined challenges in transitioning to the new mode of work. She said successful engagement on a draft negotiating text will require a strong sense of ownership by parties, and underscored the need to identify elements that enhance momentum under workstream 2.

ADP Co-Chair Kumarsingh looked forward to constructive negotiations in June and suspended the second session of the ADP at 7:14 pm.

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE MEETING

*"To reach a port we must set sail –
Sail, not tie at anchor
Sail, not drift."*

-Franklin D. Roosevelt

Delegates converged in Bonn for the first official UNFCCC climate talks of 2014 with the promise of spring in the air. However, with the marathon Warsaw COP still fresh on their minds, many acknowledged that there will be choppy waters to navigate during the year. Pressure is on the ADP to fulfill its mandate: to develop a new legal instrument under the Convention applicable to all parties by 2015 to come into effect in 2020; and to close the pre-2020 ambition gap. Delegates realized the need to get down to the business of identifying elements for the new agreement and bringing views closer together ahead of the "make or break" COP in Paris next year. This being said, expectations in Bonn were muted. Many saw ADP 2-4 as a fairly "low profile event," more of an opportunity to "soften positions before getting into negotiating mode later this year." While some delegates lamented the slow progress, the meeting did define the landscape on nationally determined contributions and agreed to constitute a contact group to start negotiating text at its next session in June.

This brief analysis will examine the meeting in the context of process and progress and draw out implications for the negotiations as they sail towards COP 20 in Lima, Peru, in December 2014, and ultimately COP 21 in Paris, France, in 2015.

CHARTING THE COURSE

Procedural issues have rocked the ADP boat since its inception and the Bonn meeting proved to be no different. The week opened with a request from the G-77/China, spurred on by the LMDC, to establish a contact group under the ADP to start negotiating text. Many delegates felt that the time for general, informal exchanges, facilitated by open-ended consultations was over, and it was now time to step up the pace to more structured negotiations in a contact group. This request echoed a similar one made almost a year earlier. At that time, however, the establishment of such a contact group was deemed premature. Indeed, since the conclusion of the general exchanges in Bangkok and Doha in 2012, many have expected the ADP to move into a more concrete mode of discussions so as to fulfill its mandate. Back in April 2013, parties were already tasked to “intensify their engagement with each other and seek to ensure that they take the work of the ADP to the next stage.” This call for the ADP to shift gears was once again up front and center in Bonn during ADP 2-4, which had been tasked by the COP in Warsaw to “further elaborate, beginning at its first session in 2014, elements for a draft negotiating text” on the 2015 agreement.

The debate over the establishment of a contact group intensified behind closed doors rather than in the plenary, particularly in the G-77/China coordination meetings, resulting in lengthy delays to the official agenda. However, anyone expecting a showdown would have been disappointed. During the informal stocktaking plenary on Wednesday, consensus emerged rather painlessly to establish a contact group, which will begin its work at the ADP’s June session.

Ultimately the issue comes down to trust and perceived ownership of the process. The specter of a “Copenhagen-style text” being parachuted into the negotiations at the eleventh hour from opaque high-level negotiations still haunts many. Indeed, some of those pushing for a contact group perceive it to have a higher status than informal consultations, with more likelihood of developing a draft negotiating agreement reflecting the views of all parties.

As several seasoned delegates ruefully noted, mistrust often manifests itself through challenges to process. Recalling the mammoth AWG-LCA “Tianjin Text” back in 2010, some countries, such as developed countries and AOSIS, worry that the outcome of contact group discussions will be an unwieldy document based on a compilation of parties’ submissions, which will ultimately sink the process. There is also concern, expressed by the Umbrella Group and the EU, that if spin-off groups are convened under the contact group, this process could fail to capture the essential interlinkages among the various elements under the ADP mandate, i.e. mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building, and transparency of action and support. Not all seemed as concerned, however, also citing previous positive experiences, such as that of the AWG-KP, which successfully “threaded the needle” using a process to develop text that involved the elaboration of elements and options without an ever-expanding text.

During the closing plenary on Friday, responding to these underlying fears, ADP Co-Chair Kishan Kumarsingh went a

long way to assure parties, with carefully chosen words, that the negotiating text would be “collectively constructed based on views expressed by parties in their submissions and statements, which would reflect a truly party-driven process.”

Some were left to wonder if in the end the whole procedural debate was just a red herring. As one negotiator said, “whether negotiations take place in a contact group or in open-ended consultations, the same parties will be discussing the same issues, with the same level of transparency, under the guidance of the same Co-Chairs.” At the end of the day, to make any meaningful progress, parties have to place their confidence and trust in the ability of the ADP Co-Chairs to produce the draft negotiating text representing everyone’s views. This is no simple task, and all eyes will be on the June session to see how the contact group’s deliberations pan out and whether parties come to the table prepared to set sail.

PUTTING WIND IN THE SAILS

Procedural issues aside, ADP 2-4 was successful in hoisting the sails by engaging parties in substantive discussions under both workstreams. In preparation for the 2015 agreement (workstream 1), parties decided in Warsaw to initiate or intensify preparation of their intended nationally determined contributions. The controversial reference to “intended nationally determined contributions that would not prejudge their legal nature” was introduced as an oral amendment in the dying minutes of the ADP closing plenary in Warsaw, effectively leaving fundamental issues, such as the legal nature of the 2015 agreement and the means to differentiate commitments in an agreement “applicable to all,” unresolved.

This was the first opportunity to address these ambiguities, and the divergence of views that the compromise Warsaw language had sought to muffle re-emerged in Bonn. While some developed countries argued that nationally determined contributions refer solely to mitigation, developing countries insisted that they should also encompass adaptation and means of implementation. The latter interpretation would imply that adaptation and means of implementation pledges by developed countries—not only those related to mitigation—are to be assessed in relation to the global goal and subject to measurement, reporting and verification.

On the legal nature of contributions, the EU and AOSIS who had pushed for adopting text in Warsaw referring to “commitments” and not “contributions,” clearly indicating their legal nature, argued that the contributions should be binding since they are part of a legally-binding agreement. On the other hand, the LMDC called for strict differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I parties’ contributions, refusing to move away from the differentiation system of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, where only developed countries had to take on binding commitments. These discussions provided the context on how parties will define and prepare the nationally determined contributions, which are expected by the first quarter of 2015.

The COP 19 decision further stipulates that contributions are to be submitted “in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the intended contributions.” ADP 2-4 kick-started discussions on what information is essential for this purpose, and what level of specificity is useful

and necessary in order to facilitate parties' domestic preparation of their contributions. The parties' interventions during the open-ended consultations at ADP 2-4 on this topic had the merit of defining the emerging landscape and areas of common ground on these information requirements, which will play a critical role in establishing a robust, yet manageable, list of information for parties to provide with their contributions.

The discussions also illustrated the need for parties to move away from generalized comments and sound bites, and make concrete proposals on how elements of the Durban Platform could be operationalized. Throughout the week delegates were prompted by the Co-Chairs to focus more on the "how," or the consideration of modalities for reflecting views and ideas in the 2015 agreement, with ADP Co-Chair Artur Runge-Metzger urging parties to "dig deeper and look each other in the eye." As one observer commented, after nearly two years "I can't believe that I'm still listening to the same statements in the ADP." Unless parties come to subsequent sessions prepared to provide concrete input about how proposals and submissions can be reflected in the agreement, an effective outcome may prove elusive.

Mixed progress was also achieved under workstream 2 on closing the ambition gap pre-2020. After spending two years identifying where the highest mitigation potential lies, the ADP was expected to shift gears and begin to address how to unlock this potential, remove barriers and accelerate mitigation achievements. By inviting experts to make presentations on successful experiences, the organization of the technical expert meetings on renewable energy and energy efficiency aimed to be concrete and focused. While some delegates welcomed the expert meetings, commenting that they had been successful in spurring bilateral conversations and in building a bridge between climate negotiators and implementers on the ground, others argued they had failed to carry out the necessary exercise of capturing and distilling the experiences presented to enable their replication. Others also questioned how they would feed into the UNFCCC negotiations. As Iran commented, "there is no time left before Lima to sit in workshops," with some qualifying these technical meetings as "a massive never-ending side event."

NAVIGATING TO LIMA

At the end of the day, ADP 2-4 was never going to set sail by itself, and one delegate even attributed the modest progress made to the fact that delegates are still suffering from a "COP hang-over." Nonetheless, the meeting did perhaps steer in the right direction by initiating frank discussion on nationally determined contributions that will have to be defined by Lima to allow parties to submit them by the first quarter of 2015, as per the Warsaw ADP decision, thereby setting the basis for the elaboration of the 2015 agreement ahead of Paris.

On raising the pre-2020 ambition, the discussions under workstream 2 moved away from roundtables and open dialogues to embark on technical expert meetings, with further technical workshops planned in June on mitigation from land use and urbanization. In addition, newer ideas, such as a possible global goal for adaptation, were debated.

Looking ahead, the ADP will have to dock at a number of ports on the way to Lima, including in Bonn in both June and October. The participation of ministers in June to discuss

ambition and the new agreement could spur political will, or just serve as another forum for airing national statements of well-known positions. Outside the UNFCCC, a number of other meetings have the potential to provide momentum, including meetings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on the upcoming fifth assessment report, the sixth replenishment of the Global Environment Facility, the meeting of the board of the Green Climate Fund, and the UN Secretary-General's Climate Summit in September.

However, as noted by UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres at the opening of the meeting, the success of the ADP may well lie outside the negotiating rooms and in the willingness of negotiators to take on the myriad of climate actions of non-state actors, including cities, local governments, youth and the military, thereby putting "wind in their sails."

UPCOMING MEETINGS

IPCC WGII 10th Session and IPCC-38: IPCC WGII will meet for approval and acceptance of its contribution to AR5. WGII assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic and natural systems to climate change, negative and positive consequences of climate change, and adaptation options. Subsequently, IPCC-38 will convene to endorse the WGII contribution to AR5.

dates: 25-29 March 2014 **location:** Yokohama, Japan **contact:** IPCC Secretariat **phone:** +41-22-730-8208 **fax:** +41-22-730-8025 **email:** IPCC-Sec@wmo.int **www:** <http://www.ipcc.ch/>

IPCC WGIII 12th Session and IPCC-39: IPCC WGIII will meet for approval and acceptance of its contribution to AR5. WGIII focuses on mitigation of climate change. Subsequently, IPCC-39 will convene to endorse the WGIII report. **dates:** 7-12 April 2014 **location:** Berlin, Germany **contact:** IPCC Secretariat **phone:** +41-22-730-8208 **fax:** +41-22-730-8025 **email:** IPCC-Sec@wmo.int **www:** <http://www.ipcc.ch/>

Third International Climate Change Adaptation Conference: The Conference titled "Adaptation Futures 2014" will connect the research community and users of climate change adaptation information at regional and global scales. **dates:** 12-16 May 2014 **location:** Fortaleza, Brazil **contact:** Secretariat **email:** adaptationfutures2014@inpe.br **www:** <http://adaptationfutures2014.ccst.inpe.br/>

46th GEF Council Meeting and GEF Assembly: The Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly will be held back-to-back with the 46th GEF Council meeting in Mexico. The CSO Consultation, GEF Council and LDCF/SCCF Council Meetings will convene from 25-27 May, with the Council meeting beginning on 25 May and overlapping for half a day, on 27 May, with the CSO Consultation. The Assembly will convene from 28-30 May. All 183 member nations, including South Sudan, the GEF's newest member, will gather for the Assembly. **dates:** 25-30 May 2014 **location:** Cancun, Mexico **contact:** GEF Secretariat **phone:** +1-202-473-0508 **fax:** +1-202-522-3240 **email:** secretariat@thegef.org **www:** http://www.thegef.org/gef/5th_assembly

UNFCCC 40th Sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies: SBI 40 and SBSTA 40 will convene in June 2014. The fifth meeting of the second session of the ADP will also take place. **dates:** 4-15 June 2014 **location:** Bonn, Germany **contact:** UNFCCC

Secretariat **phone:** +49-228-815-1000 **fax:** +49-228-815-1999
email: secretariat@unfccc.int **www:** http://unfccc.int/meetings/upcoming_sessions/items/6239.php

Pre-Pre-COP Ministerial Meeting for UNFCCC COP

20 and CMP 10: This event is organized by the Venezuelan Government and aims to examine: the role of local governments in climate change; how to engage local governments and citizens on the ground; and how local actions can be an integral part of the global agenda. **dates:** 15-18 July 2014 **location:** Caracas, Venezuela **contact:** Cesar Aponte Rivero, General Coordinator **email:** precop20@gmail.com

2014 Climate Summit: This event is being organized by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon with the aim to mobilize political will for an ambitious legal agreement through the UNFCCC process. **date:** 23 September 2014 **location:** UN Headquarters, New York, US **www:** <http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit2014/>

UNFCCC ADP 2-6: The ADP will convene for the sixth part of the second session in October 2014. **dates:** 20-24 October 2014 (tentative) **location:** Bonn, Germany **contact:** UNFCCC Secretariat **phone:** +49-228-815-1000 **fax:** +49-228-815-1999 **email:** secretariat@unfccc.int **www:** <http://unfccc.int>

IPCC-40: This IPCC meeting will be held to adopt the AR5 Synthesis Report and approve its Summary for Policymakers. **dates:** 27-31 October 2014 **location:** Copenhagen, Denmark **contact:** IPCC Secretariat **phone:** +41-22-730-8208 **fax:** +41-22-730-8025 **email:** IPCC-Sec@wmo.int **www:** <http://www.ipcc.ch/>

Pre-COP Ministerial Meeting for UNFCCC COP 20 and CMP 10: This event, organized by the Venezuelan Government, aims to revisit the engagement of civil society in the UNFCCC negotiations. **dates:** 4-7 November 2014 **location:** Caracas, Venezuela **contact:** Cesar Aponte Rivero, General Coordinator **email:** precop20@gmail.com

UNFCCC COP 20 and CMP 10: The 20th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 20) to the UNFCCC and the 10th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP) to the Kyoto Protocol will take place in Lima, Peru. **dates:** 1-12 December 2014 **location:** Lima, Peru **contact:** UNFCCC Secretariat **phone:** +49-228-815-1000 **fax:** +49-228-815-1999 **email:** secretariat@unfccc.int **www:** <http://unfccc.int>

For additional meetings and updates, go to <http://climate-l.iisd.org/>

GLOSSARY

ADP	<i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
AILAC	Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
AWG-KP	<i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Group on Annex I Parties' Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol
AWG-LCA	<i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Group on Long-Term Action under the Convention
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
CBDR	Common but differentiated responsibilities
CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
COP	Conference of the Parties
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
EE	Energy Efficiency
EIG	Environmental Integrity Group
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross domestic product
GHG	Greenhouse gas
IEA	International Energy Agency
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IRENA	International Renewable Energy Agency
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LMDCs	Like-Minded Developing Countries
LULUCF	Land use, land-use change and forestry
MOI	Means of implementation
MRV	Measuring, reporting and verification
NAMA	Nationally appropriate mitigation action
NAP	National adaptation plan
NDCs	Nationally determined contributions
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
R&D	Research and development
RE	Renewable Energy
REDD+	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, including conservation and enhancement of carbon stocks
REFIT	Renewable energy feed-in tariff
SE4All	Sustainable Energy for All
SIDS	Small island developing states
TEC	Technology Executive Committee
TM	Technology Mechanism
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change